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Grounded on institutional theory, much environmental management research has regarded that 
corporations would make the same strategic choices when facing common sets of institutional 
pressures. In this study, we consider corporation's responsiveness to environmental policy and 
regulation is different and they exhibit heterogeneous strategies depending on its distinct 
governance mechanism. By focusing on firm environmental disclosure which is a way of 
corporations’ voluntary action against climate change issue, we examine how corporate 
ownership structure and board composition affect corporations’ heterogeneous environmental 
strategies, especially in the family firm dominated economy. As a result of the logistic regression 
analysis with the sample of 241 Korean firms, we find that under the concentrated ownership 
structure, the foreign and institutional investors and the outside directors play an important role in 
encouraging firms to actively engage in firm environmental disclosure, while controlling 
shareholders group has a negative impact on the disclosure. In the current situation where the 
firms’ participation is significantly underscored in solving global environmental problems, this 
study gives meaningful implications for environmental policy makers to design the most effective 
corporate environmental programs along with theoretical and managerial implications.  
Keywords: corporate environmental management; firm environmental disclosure; carbon 
disclosure project; corporate governance 
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Under the rubric of institutional theory, environmental research has mostly assumed that 
corporations would show homogeneous environmental strategies when they face institutional 
pressure (Chen et al., 2008; Deegan et al., 2002; Rahaman et al., 2004; Reid & Toffel, 2009). 
This scholarly perspective is based on the assumption that corporations equally undergo 
legitimation process under the strong pressure of global environmental regime which urges 
corporations to adopt environmental management in their business practices (Di Maggio & 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). Some scholars, however, have recently started to question such a 
monotonous assumption from the institutional perspective and examine the reason why some 
firms show different level of activeness in environmental strategies when responding to same sets 
of institutional pressure. (Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Hoffman, 2001; 
Lewis et al., 2014; Walls & Hoffman, 2013). In this vein, with firm-level perspective, a group of 
researchers has focused on corporations’ distinct organizational characteristics, such as 
capabilities, resources (Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) or the 
managerial discretion (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Cordano & Frieze, 2000) so as to explain such 
heterogeneity in corporate environmental strategies. As one way of such scholarly interests, 
researchers have recently paid attention to corporate governance in explaining each firm’s 
different level of responses to environmental issues (Benn et al., 2014; Berrone et al., 2010; 
Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Lewis et al., 2014; Walls et al., 2012).  
 In the corporate social responsibility (hereafter, CSR) context, it is often believed that 
corporations’ social behaviours are determined mostly by the top management’s different level of 




2011; Walls et al., 2012). Furthermore, the extant CSR research has emphasized that ownership 
structure (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Oh et al., 2011), board independence, leadership and 
composition (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Brown et al., 2006; Jo & Harjoto, 2011) have a 
significant impact on corporations’ CSR strategies and social performance (Beltratti & Stulz, 
2012;; Nardis & Tonello, 2010; Walls et al., 2012). In accordance with such dominant 
perspective in the CSR context, here, we claim that corporate internal governance structure plays 
an important role in making differences in corporations’ responses to institutional pressures.  
In this research, we only consider the relationship between corporate governance and its 
environmental responses in order to differentiate it from the prior research which has dealt with 
ambiguously mixed concept of corporations’ social and environmental responsibility. In addition, 
our research especially focuses on Concentrated Ownership Structure (COS), which is frequently 
witnessed in most family firm dominated economies. By dividing shareholder groups into 
Controlling Shareholder (CS), managerial, institutional, and foreign investors (Chang, 2003; 
Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Hill & Snell, 1989), and considering various forms of board 
composition when analyzing the corporate governance, we aim to investigate which form of 
corporate governance mechanism affects corporations’ distinct strategic responses to 
environmental pressure in the context of family firm dominated economy.  
 With regard to corporations’ environmental responses, our research especially focuses on 
corporations’ response to request for voluntarily disclosing climate change information. Prior 
studies on social and environmental responsibility agree that corporations’ engagement in such 
voluntary disclosures reflects corporate governance actors’ choices and values on legitimacy 
(Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Khan et al., 2013), and willingness to ensure the accountability 




previous research, we assume that firm environmental disclosure as a reflection of organizational 
will to response to environmental issues, and the indication of the reason corporations show 
heterogeneous strategy for environmental issues. 
Our study makes two major contributions. First, by diversifying corporations’ responses 
to institutional pressure at the level of corporate governance, we complement the stringency of 
institutional theory in the field of environmental management studies. Second, by specifically 
focusing on corporate governance (e.g. COS), we improve diversity and depth of research on the 
relationship between corporate governance and environmental strategy. In order to test our 
hypotheses, we conducted the logistic regression analysis with the sample of 241 Korean firms. 
As a result, foreign and institutional investors in the ownership structure and outside directors in 
the board positively affect a corporate engagement in voluntary environmental disclosure, while 
CS is negatively associated with firm environmental disclosure.  
 
2. THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
2.1. Institutional pressures and corporate environmental strategy 
 
In analyzing the relationship between environmental policy and corporate business strategies, 
much extant environmental management studies has regarded that corporations would show 
homogeneous environmental strategic patterns when they face certain sets of institutional 
pressures (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; Berchicci & King, 2007; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Etzion, 
2007; Hart et al., 1996; Reid & Toffel, 2009; Walls & Hoffman, 2013). Such assumption stems 
from the institutional perspective, which strongly emphasizes the influence of institutional 




dominant environmental strategy in order to obtain organizational legitimacy (Campbell, 2007; 
Delmas & Toffel, 2008; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In terms of legitimation process, it is 
believed that corporations are influenced by isomorphic pressures of coercion, normatization, and 
mimetism1 (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991). Although it is still persuasive perspective 
in CSR research field, some researchers have recently started to question the institutional 
theorists’ oversimplification of corporations’ responses to institutional pressures (Darnall & 
Edwards, 2006; Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Hoffman, 2001; Lewis et al., 2014; Walls & Hoffman, 
2013).  
In order to supplement the explanation power of institutional theory in environmental 
management arena, several authors have begun to turn their look on corporations’ distinct 
organizational characteristics in explaining different corporate environmental strategies. This 
group of researchers suspects the simple function of institutional mechanisms on corporations’ 
environmental strategies and argues that corporations’ environmental strategies can vary with 
their distinct organizational characteristics (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Hoffman, 2001; Lewis et al., 
2014). Such organizational characteristics include, for examples, the capabilities, resources, and 
ownership structure of the firm (Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), 
corporate identity (Lewis et al., 2014; Sharma, 2000; Walls et al., 2012), and the characteristics 
of individual managers and their discretion (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Cordano & Frieze, 2000). 
Using insights from upper echelons and resource based theory at the firm-level perspective, such 
                                           
1 The coercive influence refers to the ability of external forces to inflict pain on the organization for being noncompliant. The 
normative influence refers to social values encroaching on the organization to conformity, and mimetism refers to the 
organizational inclination to imitate the practices of other firms operating within a given institutional mechanism (Berrone et al., 




prior research has insisted on the diversity of corporations’ responses to environmental or social 
issues.   
2.2. Corporate Governance and Firm Environmental Disclosure 
 
In this vein, some scholars have highlighted the function of corporate governance in explaining 
corporations’ distinct environmental strategy (Benn et al., 2014; Berrone et al., 2010; Darnall & 
Edwards, 2006; Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Walls et al., 2012). They argue that corporations’ 
responses to institutional pressure not only rely on external institutional mechanisms but also on 
the internal decision makers’ different level of demand on legitimacy (e.g. brand or family 
reputation or ethical images of the firm).  
First, grounded on the legitimacy theory, a significant number of researchers have argued 
that corporate governance plays a central role in determining firms’ engagement in social issues. 
In the previous CSR literature, firms’ participation in social or environmental activities have been 
regarded as a process of gaining support from the stakeholders and reducing organizational 
legitimacy gap (Gray et al., 1997; Moir, 2001). With regard to it, the top management has been 
known to have the central position to concern over the organizational legitimacy and takes 
responsibility for ensuring the accountability of the firm by conforming to institutionalized social 
norms (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Jo & 
Harjoto, 2011; Nardis & Tonello, 2010; Walls et al., 2012). Meanwhile, in terms of top 
management’s different demand on legitimacy, many CSR researchers use upper echelons theory 
or agency theory in order to explain each corporate governance group’s distinct interpretations on 




Specifically, the upper echelons theory highlights top managers’ different experiences, values, 
and personalities and relates such personal values with the top managers’ different perspective on 
the social repuation (Hambrick & Madison, 1984; Hambrick, 2007). On the other hand, agency 
theory emphasizes each corporate governance group’s organizational identity stemming from the 
internal structure of corporate governance (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Using 
such personal- and structural-oriented perspectives, many CSR researchers have underscored the 
effect of corporate governance mechanism on corporations’ heterogeneous environmental 
strategies.  
As opposed to such broad recognition in the CSR arena, however, only a handful of 
research has focused on the relationship between corporate governance and environmental 
strategy so far (Walls et al., 2012). Walls et al. (2012), and Bansal & Gao (2008) argued that CSR 
is a multidimensional construct so that researchers should make distinction between various 
dimensions of CSR. In reality, companies are required to be equipped with new corporate 
governance especially to effectively confront the powerful institutional changes caused by 
climate change (Hart et al., 1996; Hart, 1995; Marcus & Geffen, 1998; Roome, 1992). Even 
though we acknowledge that there has been a few of environmental research focusing on 
corporate governance, however, scholars’ interest has been mostly focused on dispersed 
ownership structure (DOS), where the composition and dynamics are distinguished from 
concentrated ownership structure (COS), mostly witnessed in family firm dominated economies 
(La Porta et al., 1999). In this research, we examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm responses to environmental issue in the context of COS, so that supplement 
understanding of corporate governance in the field of environmental studies. 




which has been regarded as the practical behaviour of the firm to be ‘legitimated’ in the era of 
post-Kyoto regime (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Khan et al., 2013; Lewis et al., 2014). 
According to voluntary disclosure theory, such corporate decisions are made out when the 
decision makers’ perceived benefits from the disclosure override that of costs (Verrecchia, 1983, 
1990). Throughout the process of making decisions on disclosing corporate information, top 
management takes considerations on various potential advantages and disadvantages from 
engaging in voluntary disclosure, such as increased social reputation, the reinforcement of 
upright images of the organization (Bebbington et al., 2008; Clarke & Gibson-Sweet, 1999) or 
the potential danger of being exposed to legal actions from the public (Cormier & Magnan, 1999; 
Healy & Palepu, 2001). Top management considers various possibilities from revealing corporate 
environmental information, and estimates such corporate behaviours would pay for themselves, 
individually or collectively (Berrone et al., 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Walls et al., 2012). 
Given that top management’s decisions are the embodiment of each corporate governance 
group’s opinions (Darnall & Edwards, 2006; Hambrick & Madison, 1984; Hambrick, 2007), and 
the organizational structure (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983), we claim that 
corporate decisions on disclosing environmental disclosure are likely to be influenced by internal 
corporate governance structure, specifically ownership structure and board composition (Berrone 
et al., 2010; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Walls et al., 2012). 
2.3. Ownership structure in the family firm dominated economy 
 
Corporate governance based on its differences in function and characteristics can be divided into 
DOS and COS (La Porta et al., 1999). DOS refers to the traditional subject of corporate 




and managers. On the other hand, in the COS, often found in family firm dominated economy, 
the controlling shareholder (CS), mostly on behalf of a family ownership and holding the biggest 
ownership together with the control over management is positioned as a unique existence. Since 
the CS has a chain effect on the meaning of other shareholder groups’ ownership in a row, the 
COS possesses different characteristics from the DOS (Baek et al., 2004; Classens et al., 2000; 
Joh, 2003). Drawing upon studies on corporate governance and CSR (Johnson & Greening, 1999; 
La Porta et al., 1999; Oh et al., 2011), this study divided the individual corporate governance 
group into CS, managerial, institutional, and foreign investors. In addition, by considering 
various forms of board of directors and audit committee, we insist that corporations’ different 
internal governance structure has an distinguished impact on firm environmental disclosure.  
2.4. Corporate ownership structure 
2.4.1. CS ownership and managerial ownership  
 
Concentrated ownership is classified as an external shareholder who acts as a surveillant of top 
managers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Under the COS, however, the CS is the main power that has 
a huge impact on both ownership and management, which in the agency theory it is generally 
viewed that the CS is in the same status as the top managers under the DOS who distort corporate 
governance based on their dominant control over management, depriving shareholders of their 
wealth. Thus, the CS indirectly dominates all the affiliated companies through the pyramid 
structure and is classified as an internal stakeholder that causes disparity between ownership and 
control in the agency problem (Bebchuk et al., 2000; Classens et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; 




CEO and shareholders, the problem in COS is caused by the disparity between the CS and other 
shareholders (Baek et al., 2004; Classens et al., 2000; Joh, 2003). 
 Throughout several CSR literature, it has been argued that the CS who dominantly 
decides upon the organization’s strategies is negatively associated with the corporations’ social 
behavior (Chau & Gray, 2002; Ho & Wong, 2001). In such prior studies, the CS is regarded as a 
group that mainly focuses on the benefits of family ownership and affiliate ownership, while 
having little interest in public interests (Khan et al., 2013; Oh et al., 2011). Of course, the CS is 
sometimes regarded becoming more active in paying attention to public interests than any other 
shareholder groups when their behaviors are considered to have direct connection with their 
family reputation or likely to be criticized as moral laxity from the public (Adams et al., 1996; 
Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Kets de Vries, 1993; Post, 1993; Ward, 1987). However, in most general 
situations, the CS tends to be reluctant to engage in social issues unless their detachment from the 
issues is expected to incur public condemnation or to be classified as an unethical behaviour by 
the public (Khan et al., 2013; Lewis et al., 2014; Verrecchia, 1983, 1990). With regard to it, most 
of the prior research on voluntary disclosure and corporate governance-CSR argues that the CS is 
disinterest in and, by extension, avoids the unnecessary involvement in social issues (Khan et al., 
2013; Oh et al., 2011).  
In particular, compared to other social responsibility issues (e.g., accounting fraud, labor 
abuses of human rights, and the collusion between politics and business), environmental issues, 
especially climate change issues have more vague causal relationship with individual 
corporation’s behaviour. Thus, we can interpret that the CS is less likely to perceive that such 
issues as distinct risk factor for their reputation (e.g. problematic search, Cyert & March, 1963). 




disclosing environmental information that comes at the expense of thoroughly revealing 
corporate environmental activities to the public. Based on the discussion above, we propose the 
following hypothesis. 
       
Hypothesis 1a. In the family firm dominated economy, CS ownership is negatively associated with 
firm environmental disclosure. 
    
Under the COS, top managers act like a CS or an employee who is directly controlled by CS. 
Since important decisions made by managers mostly reflect interests of the CS, his own 
independent decisions are very limited in the process of strategic implementation (Classens et al., 
2000; La Porta et al., 1999). It is clearly different situation compared to that of DOS where the 
managerial discretion is widely offered for the top managers. Focusing on such discretion given 
for top managers in the DOS, much previous literature on corporate social or environmental 
management has focused on various characteristics of managerial group (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; 
Hoffman, 2001; Lewis et al., 2014). However, managers under the COS hardly retain individual 
control and their identity tends to be weak. For instance, Samsung Electronics, the representative 
company of COS, is a subsidiary of Samsung Group and its CEO is presumably elected by the 
CS of Samsung family. Initiated by the chairman Lee Kun-Hee, the environmental strategy is 
adopted and conducted by most affiliates of Samsung group. Recently, green memory chip was 
released to the public and it was also a part of CS’ unilateral decisions for the company to get 
involved in green industry. In light of this discussion, we expected that top managers who are 




disclosure since they strictly follow CS’ decisions or tendency to avoid potential risks of 
revealing firm environmental information.  
 
Hypothesis 1b. In the family firm dominated economy, managerial ownership is negatively 
associated with firm environmental disclosure. 
 
2.4.2. Institutional ownership and foreign ownership 
 
According to the main stream of environmental research, institutional investors have already 
played an important role in influencing a corporate environmental friendly behaviours and 
transparency. First, institutional investors tend to invest in firms who take the environmental 
responsibility on themselves (Gilson & Kraakman, 1991; Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Pound, 
1992; Smith, 1996). For example, Coffey & Fryxell (1991) found that institutional investors 
invest more in socially and environmentally responsible companies since the strong signal with 
ethical business practices may appeal to them who prefer long-term economic performance to a 
short-term one. Second, institutional investors regard a firm’s proactive intention to solve 
environmental problems as a means of its sustainable development (Turban & Greening, 1997). 
Lastly, institutional investors act as a monitor in governance to encourage companies to supply 
environmentally-qualified products and they consider that such behaviours form their eco-
friendly organizational identity (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Johnson & Greening (1999) argues 




percentage of institutional ownership is high, and the institutional investors also believe 
themselves that it is their responsibility and identity to make their company more 
environmentally responsible.  
With these findings, we contend that institutional investors will probably perceive firm 
environmental disclosure as a means of strategic opportunity and the enhancement of their 
environmental legitimacy and identity. To test this, we therefore suggest the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2a. In the family firm dominated economy, institutional ownership is positively 
associated with firm environmental disclosure.  
 
Foreign investors have played an important role in improving the governance structure of a 
firm that has hardly experienced oversea investments (Jeon et al., 2011; Yoshikawa et al., 2010). 
They are not only the major sources of new funds from outside of a firm compared to individual 
investments, but they also serve to monitor problems in which agents such as top managers are 
highly involved. Such role of foreign investors who already have accumulated knowledge related 
to corporate governance restructuring are distinct in certain emerging markets where the 
monitoring device for the CS is weakly rooted within an organization (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). 
For example, Gehrig (1993) found that, just like institutional investors, foreign investors tend to 
invest in firms where profitability is stable and accounting system is clean in order to minimize 
the investment risk caused by asymmetric information. Khanna & Palepu (1999) also observed 
that foreign investors invest in transparent companies where internal transactions are low when 
the companies are located in emerging markets like India. Drawing upon these studies, Oh et al. 




soundness and transparency, which enables them to perform the role of surveillants.  
Above discussions lead to the idea that, with similar reasons for shares of institutional 
investors, shares of foreign investors will be positively associated with the firm environmental 
disclosure, which is an active form of publicizing soundness of their organization. Through 
research on companies in Egypt, Soliman et al. (2012) revealed that foreign ownership has a 
significant effect on corporations’ engagement in social activities. Kim et al. (2008) also asserted 
that, in terms of risk management, since foreign investors early recognized the importance of a 
firm’s ability to react to non-financial issue such as climate change problem, a firm’s decision on 
environmental management strategy could be adjusted by the shares of foreign investors. 
 
Hypothesis 2b. In the family firm dominated economy, foreign ownership is positively associated 
with firm environmental disclosure.  
 
2.5. Board composition 
 2.5.1. Board Independence: the proportion of outside directors in the board  
 
As to board composition, we mainly consider the existence of independent outside directors and 
audit committee that are considered to have a distinct correlation with corporations’ CSR 
activities and refer to board independence and the independence of board committee respectively 




structure where much ownership is concentrated on family-oriented owners so that the existence 
of surveillants is highly demanded, such independent bodies and members are believed to have a 
significant influence on business ethics or CSR strategies (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Garcia-Meca & 
Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Khan et al., 2013).  
From the perspective of agency theory, many scholars suggest that outside directors in 
the board function as a reliable mechanism to prevent dominant owners’ or managers’ dictatorial 
and unethical behaviours, and diffuse agency conflicts between owners and managers2 (Ben-
Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Khan et al., 2013). Fama & Jensen (1983) 
argue that the existence of independent outside directors in the board reinforces the effectiveness 
of entire corporate governance mechanism and helps to protect various stakeholders’ interests. In 
this vein, prior research on voluntary disclosure and CSR has documented that outside directors 
have incentives to establish a reputaion as professional and ethical monitors who encourage 
inside directors or managers to actively engage in social behaviors and release non-financial 
information to the public (Jo & Harjoto, 2012; Khan et al., 2013). With regard to it, Patelli & 
Prencipe (2007) argue that by voluntarily releasing non-financial information to the external 
world, outside directors tend to strenghten their image as professional surveillants of inside 
directors or managers. This is consistent with the result of Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 
(2010)’s meta-analysis research that suggests that independent directors’ presence on the board 
enhances transparency and soundness of the firm. Khan et al.(2013) also argue that corporations 
tend to be more active in CSR disclosures and activities when outside directors exist in the board.  
                                           




 Here, we contend that outside directors play an important role in encouraging firm to 
actively respond to environmental issues in order to reinforce their social reputation as reliable 
monitors of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Prior research on corporate governance and CSR 
suggests that outside directors’ existence refers to the level of board independence of the firm, 
and the board independence has been usually measured in terms of the proponent of outside 
directors in the board (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Chen et al., 2008; Garcia-Meca & 
Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010; Khan et al., 2013). Consistent with it, therefore, we assume that the 
proportion of outside directors in the board, or the board independence is positively associated 
with firm’s responding to requests to disclose environmental information. 
 
Hypothesis 3. In the family firm dominated economy, the proportion of outside directors in the 
board is positively associated with firm environmental disclosure.  
 
 2.5.2. Independence of board committee: Independent audit committee  
 
As much attention has been received on corporations’ social responsibility and business justice 
from the academia, the role of the independent audit committee is also increasingly emphasized 
in business strategy arena (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Yatim, 2009; Zaman & Sarens, 2013). Abbott 
& Parker (2000) and Zhang (2008) indicate that the existence of independent audit committees 
implies the independent level of board committee and such independence reduces information 




 Also, the existence of independent audit committee is recognized as an important role in 
the governance process and strengthening the linkage between companies and the society (Khan 
et al., 2013; Zaman & Sarens, 2013). Prior literature suggests that the audit committee has not 
only a right for overseeing accounting processes but also for controlling over the entire 
governance structure and the whole management by inspecting and reporting corporations’ 
financial and non-financial information to the public (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, & Neal, 2009; Yatim, 2009; Zaman & Sarens, 2013; Zhang, 2008). From the 
perspective of agency theory, the role of the audit committee is considered to be an indepedent 
monitor of management, or described as a reliable guardian of the public interest (Beasley et al., 
2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Zaman & Sarens, 2013).  
 In our research, we insist that the existence of independent audit committee has a positive 
impact on firm environmental disclosure. We assume that compared to internal audit function 
whose discretion is strongly confined by CS, independent body of audit committee is more likely 
to disclose environmental information in order to fulfill the public expectation to ensure public 
interests (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Beasley et al., 2009; Yatim, 2009; Zaman & Sarens, 2013; 
Zhang, 2008). Thus, we suggest the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4a. In the family firm dominated economy, the existence independent audit committee 
is positively associated with firm environmental disclosure. 
 
As opposed to the perspective of agency theory, institutional theorists argue that the existence of 
audit committee itself has nothing to do with corporations’ actual social performance (Beasley et 




ceremonial, only focusing on providing symbolic legitimacy to the firm. Actually in many family 
firm dominated economies, even though the establishment of the audit committee is required 
based on firm size, there is lack of relevant regulations on member composition of the audit 
committee which can significantly determine the actual independence of the board committee 
(Abbott & Parker, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Khan et al., 2013). In Korea, for example, under 
the commercial law, companies should set up an independent audit committee comprising of at 
least three members of the board including at least two independent directors when the total sales 
of the firm exceeds two trillion won, or about 20 billion U.S. dollars (See Korean commercial law 
clause 542-11 in 2012). Under such circumstance in COS where CS can fill family or affiliated 
members in the remaining seats in the audit committee, we might not affirm that the existence of 
audit committee itself  gaurantee the actual independence of the board committee. Instead of 
focusing only on the existence of audit committee, we additionally assume that the existence of 
independent audit committee is positively linked with firm environmental disclosure especially 
when all members in the committee are composed of outside directors. Abbott & Parker (2000) 
recommend that we also concentrate on the characteristics of audit committees including the 
member composition in the committee, not only on the existence itself, in order to analyze 
appropriate effect of audit committee. Also, Menon & Williams (1994) argue that the audit 
committees are more eager to actively satisfying public interest and acting as a monitor of 
management when there is no room to be intervened by inside directors in audit committee’s 
decision making process. Therefore, we predict that the existence of audit committee will have a 
positive effect on firm environmental disclosure especially when all the members in the 





Hypothesis 4b. For firms establishing an independent audit committee, the existence of audit 
committee is positively associated with firm environmental disclosure if the committee is only 
composed of outside directors.  
 
3. METHODS 
3.1. Sample and Data collection 
 
In this study, our main research interest is to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanism and firm environmental disclosure in the family firm dominated economy. 
To test the effect of corporate governance, we adopt the logistic regression model estimation with 
data of 241 Korean firms in 2013, which are subject companies being asked to voluntarily engage 
in Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). Among the total 250 subject companies of CDP, we exclude 
9 companies due to missing or incomplete information.  
In terms of corporate governance, Korean companies are the exemplars of the COS. After 
1976 when the Korean government began trading stocks in the market, it controlled over the CS 
of conglomerates called “Chaebol.” Due to the heterogeneity of a legal system and an economic 
environment, the corporate governance structure of Korean firms widely differ from the one of 
firms in developed countries such as America, Japan, and Germany. The corporate governance of 
Korean firms can be viewed as a ruling system owned by the owner-manager. Most of Korean 
conglomerates are directly or indirectly controlled by the owner-manager who owns 30 to 40 




ownership structure, reciprocal shareholding between affiliated companies, and tunneling in 
between affiliates, which are the common characteristics that firms with COS have demonstrated 
in family firm dominated economy (Classens et al., 2000). 
Data sources are as follows. The information about a firm environmental disclosure was 
obtained from Korea Sustainability Investing Forum (KSIF, http://www.kosif.org), which is a 
local partner of CDP in Korea, dealing with Korean companies’ engagement in CDP’s request to 
disclose information on corporate environmental strategies. Established in 2002, CDP is a U.K. 
based non-profit organization that works with global institutional investors to persuade large 
corporations to annually disclose information on environmental strategies for greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions (Lewis et al., 2014; Reid & Toffel, 2009). As an independent branch, KSIF has 
reported the result of Korean largest companies’ engagement in CDP request from 2008 annually, 
and the number of subject companies has increased from 50 in 2008 to 250 in 2013. As of 2013, 
including head office of CDP in London, there are more than 60 local partners of CDP and over 
the number of 5,000 firms are subject to respond to CDP’s request for disclosing environmental 
information. 
We acquired corporate financial data for our control variables from KIS-VALUE data base 
offered by Korea Investor’s Service and from TS2000 established by Korea Listed Companies 
Association (KLCA). In collecting information about corporate governance, each ownership and 
board composition data was obtained from KIS-VALUE, TS2000, and Korea Financial 







3.2.1. Independent variable 
   
The independent variables in this study contain information on ownership structure and board 
composition of companies. In terms of ownership, CS ownership (CSO) is the sum of the biggest 
shareholder’s ownership and family or affiliate ownership while managerial ownership (MO) and 
foreign ownership (FO) is the sum of top managers’ stock holding ratio and percentage of shares 
taken by foreigners, respectively. Institutional ownership (IO) includes securities company 
ownership, insurance company and bank ownership.  
 In the case of variables for board composition, first, we see the proportion of outside 
directors in the board (POD) in order to indirectly measure the level of board independence of 
the firm (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Chen et al., 2008; Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 
2010; Khan et al., 2013). The existence of independent audit committee (IAC) was a binary 
variable coded ‘1’ if a firm has an independent audit committee. Lastly, in order to measure the 
effect of member composition of the audit committee (MCAC), we coded ‘1’ if the audit 
committee is only composed of outside directors, and ‘o’ if there is an inside director in the 
committee (Abbott & Parker, 2000; Menon & Williams, 1994).      
 





Our analysis focuses on corporations’ different strategic response to environmental issues, which 
we measure by observing corporations’ acquiesce to the request from the CDP to disclose climate 
change information. In 2013, from the head office of CDP and through the KSIF, 250 largest 
Korean companies (in terms of market capitalization) were asked to complete a questionnaire 
including questions on corporate governance, climate change strategy, reduction targets and 
current status of GHG emissions, and the potential risks and opportunities to the firm posed by 
climate change issue3. The result of the survey is stored in and posted on CDP database, and 
provided to thousands of institutional shareholders across the world informing as to whether each 
company has responded to the questionnaire or declined to do so (Reid & Toffel, 2009). In 
evaluating CDP, Reid & Toffel (2009) states that it is the largest repository of corporate GHG 
emissions data in the world. Consistent with previous research, our dependent variable, CDP is a 
binary variable coded ‘1’ if firms answered the CDP questionnaire and ‘0’ otherwise (Lewis et al., 
2014; Reid & Toffel, 2009).           
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
 
To clearly examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm 
environmental disclosure, we controlled for the factors that could affect corporations’ 
environmental disclosure. Including variables that have been believed to be related to disclosure, 
                                           





such as firm size (FSIZE), leverage (LEV), firm age (FAGE), return on assets (ROA) and 
industry sector (IND) (Khan et al., 2013), we also additionally consider “Target (TARGET)” and 
“Chaebol (CHAEBOL)” as our control variables. In this research, Target refers as to whether 
corporations are designated as a managed object of a governmental regulation, “Target Scheme” 
which requires companies to reduce the amount of GHG emissions. Corporations’ social 
behaviours or voluntary actions are believed to be significantly influenced by the stringency of 
the institutional regulatory environment (Lewis et al., 2014; Reid & Toffel, 2009), and the Target 
Scheme is one of the few regulations directly regulating GHG emissions of Korean firms. 
Referring to 2012-135 notified by The Korea Ministry of Knowledge Economy in 2012, Target 
was coded as ‘1’ if firms were the managed objects of Target Scheme, and ‘0’ otherwise. 
Similarly, in terms of Chaebol, which we here observe a governmental restriction on mutual 
investment of conglomerates in Korea, we try to control for the influence institutional regulatory 
environment on corporate decisions on social behaviour4. Even though it is not directly related 
with climate change issue, such a strong regulation on as to large companies’ business ethics 
makes corporations to be more eager to ensuring social reputation (Chang, 1996, 2003; Lewis et 
al., 2014; Reid & Toffel, 2009). We named our control variable Chaebol and coded as ‘1’ if firms 
are the target companies of governmental restriction on mutual investment with other group-
affiliated firms and ‘0’ otherwise. 
 With regard to rest of other control variables, we controlled for the firm size as natural 
logarithm of total assets in order to capture the tendency of large firms to disclose voluntary 
                                           
4 In Korea, mutual investment of group-affiliated companies whose financial capitalization exceeds 5trillion won (about 50 




information more than small firms (Lewis et al., 2014; Reid & Toffel, 2009). Following prior 
research, we also controlled for leverage, since companies with high debt ratio are believed to 
have a tendency to disclose social responsibility information to the public (Khan et al., 2013; 
Purushothaman et al., 2000). Leverage variable is measured as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. Also consistent with prior research, we controlled for return on assets, firm age, and 
industry sector that are considered to affect corporate social behaviour and voluntary disclosure. 
Firm age is measured as the number of years that the firm has been in operation. In terms of 
industry sector, we used the firm’s two-digit Korea standard industrial classification (KSIC).  
 
3.3. Estimation method 
 
We tested our hypotheses using logistic regression model and estimated the likelihood that a firm 
would engage in CDP. The following equation is used to test our hypotheses: 
 
P	(CDP   = 1) = F(β 	+      β + ε ) 
 
Where i represents firms, j represents industry j, t represents year, and CDP    is the dependent 
variable. X is a set of explanatory variables including control and independent variables that are 




time series analysis method by observing one-year lagged data of our control variables, while 
using current year data of corporate governance. To see the effect of member composition of the 
audit committee on firm environmental disclosure, related to our explanatory variable in 
hypothesis 4b, we conduct a separate analysis only targeting 159 firms with an independent audit 




<Table 1> reports the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients between the 
dependent, independent, and control variables. Among 241 firms, 91 firms responded to CDP 
request to disclose corporate environmental information (about 38%). The average ownership of 
CS, managerial, foreign and institutional ownership is 39.4, 0.08, 19.5, and 5.9% respectively. 
The average ratio of outside directors in the board is 53.5%, while the number of firms having an 
independent audit committee is 159 (about 66%). Among 159 firms with an independent audit 
committee, 140 firms have the audit committee with all of the committee members are outside 
directors (about 88%). Most of the correlations between the variables were significant at the p < 
0.05 level. All correlations are well below the commonly used cut-off threshold of 0.7, and all 
value of variance inflation factor (VIF) is ranged from 1.04 at minimum to 2.24 at maximum. As 





Insert <Table 1> about here 
  
Using logistic regression model, we test our hypotheses and report the coefficient 
estimates for the independent and control variables. We interpret the magnitude of our coefficient 
estimates using odds ratios and marginal effects. More detailed results for each model appear in 
<Table 2> and <Table 3>. 
 
Insert <Table 2> and <Table 3> about here 
  
 <Table 2> shows the test results of our hypotheses 1a through 4a, which considers the 
total sample size (241 firms) of our research within its analysis. In <Table 2>, Model 1 includes 
the relationship between our control variables and dependent variable, CDP, showing that firm 
size, leverage, and target are positively significant in corporations’ response to request for 
environmental disclosure. In hypothesis 1a and 1b, we suggested that an increase in CS 
ownership and managerial ownership leads to a decrease in the probability of firm response to 
request for disclosing environmental information. According to Model 2 which shows such 
relationships, the coefficient estimate for CS ownership is -1.405 (p<0.001), indicating that 
hypothesis 1a is clearly supported. More specifically, following prior research and 
recommendations by Dobson (2002), we explain our results using odds ratio (Zhang et al., 2013). 
In terms of CS ownership, our results suggest that a 5% increase in the CS ownership decreases 
the odds ratio (the probability of a firm to respond to CDP/the probability of a firm not to respond 




marginal effect, when all the variables are held at their sample mean levels, a 5% increase in the 
CS ownership leads to a -1.1% decrease in the probability that this firm disclose environmental 
information. In terms of managerial ownership, however, we could not find statistical 
significance which indicates that hypothesis 1b is not supported.  
 Hypothesis 2a and 2b were to examine whether institutional ownership and foreign 
ownership are positively associated with firm environmental disclosure respectively. According 
to model 3 including both relationships, the coefficient estimates for institutional ownership and 
foreign ownership are 1.039 (p<0.01) and 1.538 (p<0.001) respectively. These results offer 
statistically significant evidence that greater presence of institutional ownership and foreign 
ownership in ownership structure is connected with more active firm environmental disclosure. 
These results also suggest that a 5% increase in institutional ownership increases the odds ratio 
by approximately 5% (exp(1.039*5%)-1=0.05), while a 5% increase in foreign ownership 
increases the odds ratio by approximately 8% (exp(1.538*0.05)-1=0.08). Setting all other 
variables at their means, a 5% increase in the institutional ownership leads to 0.4% increase in the 
probability of firm environmental disclosure. Similarly, a 5% increase in the foreign ownership 
leads to a 0.7% increase in the probability of this firm response to request for CDP. Hypothesis 2a 
and 2b are clearly supported.        
 In hypothesis 3, we suggested that the proportion of outside directors in the board is 
positively related with firm environmental disclosure. According to Model 4, the coefficient 
estimate for the proportion of outside directors in the board is 0.929 (p<0.05), indicating that 
hypothesis 3 is supported. Also in terms of odds ratio, our results suggest that a 5% increase in 
the proportion of outside directors in the board increases the odds ratio by approximately 5% 




increase in the proportion of outside directors in the board leads to a 1.9% increase in the 
probability of firm environmental disclosure. Hypothesis 4a was to examine the relationship 
between the existence of audit committee and firm environmental disclosure. With regard to it, 
Model 5 indicates that the existence of audit committee is not statistically significant in 
corporations’ response to request for environmental disclosure. Thus, hypothesis 4a is not 
supported. In Model 6 (Full model in our main analysis) that simultaneously examines the effects 
of our explanatory variables on dependent variable, institutional ownership, foreign ownership 
and the proportion of outside directors in the board were positively associated with firm 
environmental disclosure at the significant level, p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.05 respectively, while 
the CS ownership had a negative effect on firm environmental disclosure (p<0.05). It still 
confirms hypothesis 1a, 2a, 2b and hypothesis 3. However, the effect of managerial ownership 
(hypothesis 1a) and the existence of audit committee (hypothesis 4a) were still not significant in 
Model 6. 
 In <Table 3> for the test of the hypothesis 4b, we only consider the firms with 
independent audit committee (159 firms) within its analysis. Hypothesis 4b suggests that member 
composition in the audit committee influences firm environmental disclosure. Before the test, we 
divided audit committee into dichotomous groups depending on as to whether the committee is 
only composed of outside directors or not, in order to capture the true sense of independence of 
board committee from the inside directors. As a result of our separate analysis on 159 firms 
having an independent audit committee (Model 8), audit committees only composed of outside 
directors increased the odds that firms would disclose environmental information by a factor of 
2.89 (exp(1.058), p<0.05). This means that setting all other variables to their means, firms whose 




acquiescing to CDP request, versus 26% for firms whose independent audit committee includes 
inside directors. In other words, the probability of acquiescing to CDP request is 25% higher 
when the independent audit committee is only composed of outside directors. Thus, hypothesis 




In this research, we insist that corporations’ responses to environmental issues vary with the 
characteristics of corporate governance structure. For this purpose, we examined the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanism and firm environmental disclosure in the family firm 
dominated economy. Throughout our test result, we could identify that under the COS, the 
foreign and institutional investors and the outside directors play an important role in encouraging 
firms to actively engage in firm environmental disclosure, while CS ownership has a negative 
impact on the disclosure. This implies that each corporate governance group has different 
motivations for engaging in social issues and different level of demand for organizational 
reputation from such activities.  
To be more specific on ownership structure, we could first observe a negative association 
between CS ownership and firm environmental disclosure. Here, we interpret that CS has less 
motivation for voluntarily disclosing environmental information that comes at the expense of 
thoroughly revealing corporate environmental activities to the public. Throughout previous 




detachment from the issues is expected to incur public condemnation (Khan et al., 2013; Lewis et 
al., 2014; Verrecchia, 1983, 1990). In light of the result of prior research and our empirical 
analysis, CS is highly expected to perceive that the involvement in such voluntary programs has 
little to do with their social reputation.  
On the other hand, we could find that foreign and institutional ownership has a positive 
influence on corporations’ response to request for disclosing environmental information. We 
expect that they put high value on public interest and constructing ethical or eco-friendly images 
by actively participating in voluntary environmental programs. In addition, from the perspective 
of agency theory, we can also judge that they try to reinforce their organizational identity as a 
surveillant of CS by underscoring corporations’ social behaviours in which the CS are not much 
interested. The result is in the same vein with the study of Coffey & Fryxell (1991), Oh et al. 
(2011) who argued that foreign- and institutional investor’s role of surveillant have a positive 
influence on corporate social activities and performance as well. However, we could not see 
statistical significance in hypothesis 1a related to managerial ownership. With regard to it, we 
interpret that most firms which have COS as a governance structure, managers do not have a 
distinguished role in corporations’ environmental activities in that they are strongly controlled by 
CS’ policy and have little discretion on engaging in voluntary environmental programs.  
In terms of board composition, we examined the proportion of outside directors in the board 
and the existence of audit committee throughout our main analysis. In another set of analysis, we 
separately investigated the effect of independent audit committee on firm environmental 
disclosure by additionally considering the member composition of the committee. From these 





As a result of our analyses, we found that outside directors play an important role in 
corporations’ environmental activities by acting in both board and board committee. This result is 
consistent with the result of prior CSR research, such as that of Garcia-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta 
(2010) and Khan et al. (2013) which indicate that the existence and high proportion of outside 
directors in the board composition have positive impact on corporations’ CSR disclosure. In this 
research, we suggest that outside directors play an important role in corporations’ environmental 
activities in that they recognize such behaviours would enhance their social reputation as a 
“guardian of public interest” (Beasley et al., 2009; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Zaman & Sarens, 2013).  
However, we could not observe statistical significance in the effect of existence of 
independent audit committee itself on firm environmental disclosure. On the one hand, this 
supports the institutional theorists’ perspective that the existence of independent board committee 
itself is nothing more than providing symbolic legitimacy to the firm. However, by observing the 
member composition of audit committee, we could see the positive impact of independence board 
committee on firm environmental disclosure when all committee members are composed of 
outside directors. This implies that the true sense of the independence of board committee 
depends on the member composition of the committee that can block the inside directors’ 
intervention in the decision making process of the committee. The result of our analysis supports 
the viewpoint of Abbott & Parker (2000) that suggests that we should focus not only on the 
existence of board committee, but also on its characteristics in order to righteously see the true 







Our findings provide theoretical and practical implications and propose a new perspective of 
environmental issue that future studies can take as a useful reference. First, and most importantly, 
this study contributes to enriching the institutional theory in the environmental management 
research. Existing environmental policy and management research has highlighted the unilateral 
influence of institutional pressure on corporate environmental strategies, regarding that 
corporations would make the same strategic choices when facing common sets of institutional 
pressures (Chen et al., 2008; Deegan et al., 2002; Rahaman et al., 2004; Reid & Toffel, 2009). In 
our efforts to unravel the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and different 
corporate responses to environmental issues, we identify specific corporate strategic responses on 
environmental regulatory pressure and contribute to diversity of institutional perspective on 
environmental research. Second, by considering entire corporate governance mechanism in a 
consolidated analysis framework, we provide a broader and well-balanced perspective for those 
who research on corporate governance-environmental management. In most previous 
environmental research, scholarly interest has been highly focused on certain subgroup’s role, 
such as that of CEOs or managerial groups, who are believed to be the main agent who 
independently implements corporate environmental strategies under the DOS. Unlike previous 
research, however, we consider ownership structure and board composition as a whole, and 
examine the effect of corporate governance mechanism on firm responses to an environmental 
issue. Walls et al.(2012) argue that environmental researchers should comprehensively consider 
the entire corporate governance structure in a single consolidated analysis, since ownership, 
board of directors, and management do not work in isolation but closely interrelated with each 




perspective. Lastly, our study particularly focused on the COS that has intrinsic mechanism 
mostly found in family firm dominated economies. We found that foreign and institutional 
investors in the corporate ownership structure and outside directors in the board composition are 
positively associated with firm environmental disclosure. This can give meaningful implications 
for environmental policy makers, especially in the family firm dominated economies, to design 
the most effective corporate environmental programs and develop effective regulations on 
corporate environmental governance.   
In spite of these contributions, our study has several limitations. First, in our efforts to 
explain corporations’ distinct responses to environmental issues, we confine institutional pressure 
to corporations’ responses to CDP, a specific type of environmental programs. We acknowledge 
that each subgroup of corporate governance has different level of demand for organizational 
legitimacy, depending on the characteristics of each program and regulation. For example, under 
the COS, CS is regarded as not only a group that has low level of interest in public issues, but 
also becomes highly sensitive to social issues if they recognize such issues as threatening factors 
for their social reputation (Adams et al., 1996; Dyer & Whetten, 2006; Kets de Vries, 1993; Post, 
1993; Ward, 1987). Even though we could identify here that CS is not interested in participating 
in CDP, they might show high level of activeness in engaging in environmental programs if such 
issues are receiving substantial attention from the public. At this point, we might be able to only 
suggest that CS perceives that the potential costs of engagement in CDP override that of potential 
benefits in the status quo. In order to add more confidence to the result of our research, it is 
necessary in future research to select other sets of environmental programs or regulations, and 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and responses to such different 




In addition, our analysis cannot still fully explain the role of corporate governance 
mechanism in corporations’ actual contribution to sustainable development. Our research 
restrictedly focuses on corporations’ response to request for firm environmental disclosure, but 
not on actual corporate environmental performance. Even though we here claim that the 
surveillant role of foreign and institutional investors, and outside directors encourages firms to be 
more active in environmental programs, they may not have positive relationship with the actual 
improvement of corporate environmental performance. By defining the term “Greenwashing 
effect” as corporations’ deceptive environmental management practices, some scholars warn that 
researchers avoid hastily forming a direct interpretation corporations’ activeness in environmental 
issue as their actual contributions to sustainable development (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Roulet 
& Touboul, 2014). In this vein and to extend our research, it is necessary in future research to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and corporate actual 
environmental performance.  
In this study, we attempted to provide a comprehensive understanding of corporate 
governance that could enhance corporations’ participation in environmental programs and 
regulations. In closing, future research needs to extend the context of our study by considering 
various factors for corporations’ different environmental strategies and responses to institutional 
pressures. Since environmental management research requires multilateral analysis like other 
management studies (Walls et al., 2012), more specific and multifaceted approach will be needed 
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<TABLE 1>  
 Descriptive statistics (N=241) 
 Note: CDP dummy variable equals 1 if a firm respond to CDP’s request to disclose climate change information, LEV ratio of total debt to total assets, ROA return on assets, FSIZE natural 
logarithm of total assets, FAGE the number of years since the firm’s inception TARGET dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is designated to obligatorily reduce the amount GHG emissions by the 
government, CHAEBOL dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is the target company of governmental restriction on mutual investment with other group-affiliated firms, CSO percentage of shares owned 
by controlling shareholders, MO percentage of shares owned by managerial group, IO percentage of shares owned by institutional investors, FO percentage of shares owned by foreign investors, 
POD proportion of outside directors in the board, IAC dummy variable equals 1 if a firm has an independent audit committee  
All control variables are lagged one year, while current year data is used for independent variables. 
* p < 0.05
 
Mean S.D. Min Max CDP LEV ROA FSIZE FAGE TARGET CHAEBOL CSO MO IO FO POD IAC 
CDP 0.378 0.486 0 1 1 
            
LEV 0.464 0.253 0.017 1.908 0.279* 1 
           
ROA 0.055 0.225 -0.284 3.364 0.032 -0.222* 1 
          
FSIZE 28.348 1.722 22.717 32.882 0.488* 0.344* -0.09 1 
         
FAGE 37.602 19.173 2 114 0.257* 0.118 0.052 0.421* 1 
        
TARGET 0.456 0.499 0 1 0.369* 0.041 -0.084 0.303* 0.286* 1 
       
CHAEBOL 0.539 0.499 0 1 0.256* 0.186* 0.02 0.433* 0.197* 0.312* 1 
      
CSO 39.361 17.294 0 87.43 -0.207* -0.02 0.119 -0.068 -0.004 0.02 0.125 1 
     
MO 0.084 0.187 0 1.31 -0.047 0.107 -0.065 -0.038 -0.048 -0.091 -0.067 -0.037 1 
    
IO 5.888 8.741 0 42.64 0.159* 0.053 -0.048 0.075 -0.013 0.002 -0.034 -0.015 0.039 1 
   
FO 19.453 15.957 0 76.56 0.261* -0.174* -0.006 0.291* 0.065 0.088 0.017 -0.37* -0.046 0.101 1 
  
POD 0.535 0.139 0 0.889 0.177* -0.033 -0.041 0.146* -0.064 0.057 0.142* -0.063 -0.097 -0.089 0.187* 1 
 





Results of logistic regression - firm environmental disclosure (Main analysis, N=241) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















 (2.053) (2.276) (3.190) (2.216) (2.072) (3.085) 
ROA 1.037 1.105 0.977 0.888 0.997 1.093+ 
 (0.845) (1.005) (1.070) (1.091) (0.875) (1.887) 
FSIZE 2.143*** 1.904*** 1.450* 1.984*** 2.330*** 1.767** 
 (3.753) (3.380) (2.512) (3.502) (3.519) (2.585) 
FAGE 0.075 0.066 0.356 0.271 0.067 0.493 
 (0.184) (0.161) (0.850) (0.635) (0.165) (1.112) 
TARGET 1.932*** 2.079*** 2.273*** 1.863*** 1.945*** 2.409*** 
 (3.730) (3.887) (4.080) (3.689) (3.726) (4.105) 
CHAEBOL 0.042 0.222 0.235 -0.040 0.129 0.516 
 (0.098) (0.503) (0.521) (-0.093) (0.289) (1.025) 
CSO  -1.405***    -1.116* 
  (-3.503)    (-2.465) 
MO  -0.066    -0.459 
  (-0.163)    (-0.852) 
IO   1.039**   1.257** 
   (2.729)   (3.134) 
FO   1.538*** 
(3.316) 
  1.243* 
(2.443) 
POD    0.929*  1.062* 
    (2.412)  (2.560) 
IAC     -0.315 -0.882 
     (-0.608) (-1.516) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241 
df_m 13 15 15 14 14 19 
ll_0 -159.8 -159.8 -159.8 -159.8 -159.8 -159.8 
Ll -107.4 -100.5 -96.90 -104.3 -107.2 -88.74 
chi2 104.7 118.4 125.7 110.8 105.1 142.0 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
Models show the test results of our hypotheses 1a through 4a, which consider the total sample size (241 firms) of our 
research. 
CDP dummy variable equals 1 if a firm respond to CDP’s request to disclose climate change information, LEV ratio of total 
debt to total assets, ROA return on assets, FSIZE natural logarithm of total assets, FAGE the number of years since the 
firm’s inception TARGET dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is designated to obligatorily reduce the amount GHG 
emissions by the government, CHAEBOL dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is the target company of governmental 
restriction on mutual investment with other group-affiliated firms, CSO percentage of shares owned by controlling 
shareholders, MO percentage of shares owned by managerial group, IO percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors, FO percentage of shares owned by foreign investors, POD proportion of outside directors in the board, IAC 
dummy variable equals 1 if a firm has an independent audit committee 
All models include industry effects. 





Results of logistic regression - firm environmental disclosure  
(Separate analysis for firms with an independent audit committee, N=159)  
 
 (7) (8) 
 CDP CDP 
IND Yes Yes 
LEV 1.059+ 1.342* 
 (1.790) (2.126) 
ROA 4.752+ 5.182* 
 (1.883) (2.047) 
FSIZE 2.121** 2.116** 
 (3.263) (3.189) 
FAGE 0.041 -0.028 
 (0.087) (-0.058) 
TARGET 2.120*** 2.067** 
 (3.374) (3.248) 
CHAEBOL 0.260 0.234 
 (0.508) (0.432) 
MCAC  1.058* 
  (1.994) 
Observations 159 159 
df_m 13 14 
ll_0 -110.1 -110.1 
Ll -71.97 -69.83 
chi2 76.17 80.45 
Note: Standardized beta coefficients; t statistics in parentheses 
Models only consider the firms with an independent audit committee 
(159 firms). 
CDP dummy variable equals 1 if a firm respond to CDP’s request to 
disclose climate change information, LEV ratio of total debt to total 
assets, ROA return on assets, FSIZE natural logarithm of total assets, 
FAGE the number of years since the firm’s inception TARGET 
dummy variable equals 1 if a firm is designated to obligatorily reduce 
the amount GHG emissions by the government, CHAEBOL dummy 
variable equals 1 if a firm is the target company of governmental 
restriction on mutual investment with other group-affiliated firms, 
MCAC dummy variable equals 1 if the audit committee is only 
composed of outside directors 
All models include industry effects. 






국   
도  이 에 하여 많  경 경  연구는 공동  도  압 에 해 업
이 동일한 략  택  보일 것이라 주장해 다. 본 연구에 는 경  규 에 
한 업  이 지 구조 커니즘에 라  다른 략  보일 것이라 간
주한다. 후 변  에 한 업  자  행동 안  한가지  자  
경 보 공시에  맞추어, 우리는 특히 가족 업 가 지 인 경  
내에 , 업  소  구조  이사회 구 이 업  경 경  략에 어떠한 향
 미 는지 분 한다. 241개  한국 업 샘플   지스틱 회귀 분
 시행한 결과, 우리는 집  소  구조 (Concentrated Ownership Structure) 
하에  외국인 투자자   투자자, 그리고 이사회 내  사외 이사 이 업
 경 보 공시에 인 향 , 면 지 주주 지분  부 인 향  
미 다는  견하 다. 후 변 를 롯한 경  해결에 업  극  
참여가 강조 고 있는  상황에  본 연구는 경 학 이 에 한 공헌, 실천  
함  불어 경 책 입안자  효  규  구상에 공헌한다. 
키워드: 경경 ; 자  경경  보 공시; 탄소 보공개 프 트 (Carbon 
Disclosure Project, CDP); 업 지 구조 
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